Testing of network services represents one of the biggest challenges in cyber security. Because new vulnerabilities are detected on a regular basis, more research is needed. These faults have their roots in the software development cycle or because of intrinsic leaks in the system specification. Conformance testing checks whether a system behaves according to its specification. Here model-based testing provides several methods for automated detection of shortcomings. The formal specification of a system behavior represents the starting point of the testing process. In this paper, a widely used cryptographic protocol is specified and tested for conformance with a test execution framework. The first empirical results are presented and discussed.
Introduction
Security services are frequently used in fields like online banking, e-government and online shops. With increased availability of such services the number of security risks rises both for users and providers alike. In order to ensure a secure communication between peers in terms of authenticity, privacy and data integrity, cryptographic protocols are applied to regulate the data transfer. These protocols provide a standardized set of rules and methods for the interaction between peers.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [9] is a widely used security protocol. TLS is the successor of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [20] . Both protocols encompass a set of rules for the communication between client and server and rely on public-key cryptography in order to ensure integrity of exchanged data.
However, despite multiple prevention measurements several vulnerabilities, like Heartbleed [10] and DROWN [4] , among others, have been discovered recently. This leads to the conclusion that more effort has to be invested for testing the implementations of such security protocols.
For this sake, many approaches have been introduced over the years. Some of them come from the area of model-based testing. Methods like fuzzing [17] encompass methods and principles and help to detect further leaks in software. Other techniques rely on evolutionary algorithms [6] or adaptations of artificial intelligence to concrete types of a system under test (SUT).
On the other hand, non-functional testing, i.e, testing the way that the system operates, like conformance testing [19] , is applied to check whether a system corresponds to its specification.
In this paper, we present a formal model for the draft TLS 1.3 handshake [13] , defined according to the TLS standard. According to our knowledge, this is the first formal model of the draft TLS 1.3 handshake. Then, a test execution framework tests a TLS implementation in an automated manner and checks whether the execution is conform to the behaviour specified by the formal model. Finally, a verdict is given about the correctness of the tested TLS implementations in terms of the obtained test results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the TLS 1.3 handshake. Section 3 describes the challenges and choices for devising our formal model. Section 4 describes our validation approach and discusses the results. Section 5 gives an overview about related literature. Finally, Section 6 gives some concluding remarks and future work directions.
Transport Layer Security Handshake Protocol
The handshake protocol enables a TLS client and server to establish a secure, authenticated communication link. The TLS handshake consists of the four steps: (i) consent on the version of the protocol to use and choose cryptographic algorithms; (ii) exchange and validate certificates to authenticate each other; (iii) generate a shared secret key; and (iv) abort the handshake with an alert.
Main TLS 1.3 handshake messages
The handshake itself consists of different message types, so-called TLS messages, and corresponding parameters that are part of these messages. Every such parameter comprehends specific values, where some of them are assigned dynamically during the handshake procedure. The main messages exchanged during the TLS handshake steps are:
i. The client and the server agree upon the version of the protocol and cryptographic algorithms to use by exchanging the client hello, hello retry request, server hello, and encrypted extensions messages.
• The client hello is always the first message, and a client should resend a client hello message only if the server responded to it by a hello retry request message. It contains the client's cryptographic information; the supported version of protocol, the preshared keys, the list of symmetric cipher options, and the extended functionalities.
• The server hello is the response (message) from the server to the client hello message if the server was able to negotiate an acceptable set of handshake parameters based on the client hello. It contains the cryptographic information negotiated: the protocol version, the list of symmetric cipher, and the server extensions.
• The hello retry request is the response (message) from the server to the client hello message if the server was not able to find an acceptable set of parameters. It contains the same cryptographic information as the serverhello message.
• The encrypted extensions message is sent by the server immediately after the server hello message. This is the first message that is encrypted using keys derived from the server handshake traffic secret. It contains extensions that can be protected.
ii. An authentication with a certificate between the server and the client can be requested by exchanging the certificate request, certificate, and certificate verify messages.
• The certificate request message must be sent by the server directly after the encrypted extensions message if the server requests a certificate. It contains an identification of the certificate request and a set of extensions describing the parameters of the certificate.
• The certificate message is sent by the server and by the client. It contains their respective certificate to be used for authentication, and any other supporting certificates.
• The certificate verify message is directly sent by the server and by the client after the respective certificate message. It contains a signature using the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate message.
iii. The server and the client generate and share a secret key by exchanging the finished message. The finished message is sent by the server, then by the client. It contains a message authentication code (MAC).
iv. The client or the server can abort the handshake, and close the connection if at any step of the handshake, a failure happened. To do so, they should exchange an alert message. The alert message contains the description of the alert.
Handshake TLS 1.3 interactions
The TLS messages make up the interaction between a client and a server and exchange values. The most important feature is the negotiation of cryptographic parameters that ensures privacy and integrity of exchanged information. During the procedure, client and server agree on used protocol version, exchange random values and select cryptographic algorithms for encryption and decryption of transferred data. Both peers exchange keys and certificates and after the handshake is finished, they can start to encrypt and exchange application data. A summary of the interactions and the message exchanges from the client side and the server side is respectively depicted in the state machines [13] shown on Figure 1a and Figure 1b . The state machines are transition based, the state names are for sake of readability only, and conditional actions are represented in brackets ([]). Note that these state machines do not represent the client's and server's Alert message interactions. The server and the client have to abort the handshake with an Alert message if one of the TLS 1.3 requirements textually described in the draft TLS 1.3 handshake [13] is not respected. As an example, we describe here three requirements taken from the draft TLS 1.3 handshake [13]:
• The handshake messages should be sent in one of the orders represented in a path of the state machines given in Figure 1 . If a message is sent in the wrong order, the handshake connection will be aborted with an "unexpected message" alert.
• The TLS 1.3 handshake refuses renegotiation without a hello retry request message, thus the client hello message can only be exchanged in the beginning of the protocol or after receiving a hello retry request message. If renegotiation takes place, the handshake is aborted with an "unexpected message" alert.
• When the client receives a hello retry request message, the client should check that cryptographic information contained in the hello retry request is different from the information in the initial client hello message. If not, the handshake is aborted with an "illegal parameter" alert.
In the sequel, we will not consider the internal processing of the TLS handshake but we will focus instead on the TLS messages, deaving the information exchange to be handled by the execution framework and the SUT. Thus, our formal model represents the behaviour of the handshake, a critical part of the TLS. 
Formal Model of the TLS Handshake in LNT
Taking the draft specification of the Transport Layer security (TLS) [13] protocol Version 1.3 as starting point, our main contribution in this paper is the formalisation of the Handshake protocol of TLS in the LNT language [12, 7] . In this section, we give a brief description of our model, which encompasses the handshake messages and illustrate then the handshake interactions. We discuss the challenges to specify the TLS handshake in LNT with concrete examples. The full LNT model is given in Appendix A.
Handshake messages
The handshake messages and their encryption information are defined as types. Our model contains 43 types, with simple types as enumerations, lists, or more sophisticated ones, such as "union like" types. The main challenge was the definition of "abstract" types, regrouping several subtypes. One of the encryption parameters of the client hello message, the Extensions is for instance an "abstract" type. The Extensions is a list of Extension types, and an Extension is a tuple: an extension type and an extension data. LNT provides some predefined functions, which simplify the modeling task by avoiding the definition of classical useful functions. For instance, the following LNT definition of the client hello message described in Section 2, uses three predefined functions to support notation x.f and compare values of the ClientHello type ("cons" and "remove"). The extension type is defined by an enumeration of 21 extension types. The extension data is a type regrouping several constructors, each of them having its own parameters and corresponding to an extension type. We implemented 9 of the 21 respective extension data constructors in our model. Consider for instance the definition of one of the mandatory extensions in TLS 1.3, the supported version extension. We want to model a supported version extension for the protocol "TLS 1.2" in LNT.
To do so, we need an extension with the supported version type, and with an extension data using the constructor "SupportedVersions", which takes as a parameter a supportedVersion, i.e., a list of protocol versions. 
Handshake interactions
Our modeling of the communication between client and server is based on the state machines ( Figure 1 ) and the handshake TLS 1.3 requirements discussed in Section 2.2.
The server and the client are modeled by two processes (Appendix A.3) communicating by rendezvous on gates, i.e., the communication is blocked by both sending and receiving messages: the one waiting for a rendezvous is suspended and terminates immediately after the rendezvous takes place. Concretely, the server and the client processes correspond to their respective states machines ( Figure 1 ) extended with the management of the Alert message. Each kind of handshake message is implemented in a process, and two additional processes by kind of handshake message sent by the client and the server.
The difficulty was the extraction of definitions from the informal definition of the TLS 1.3 handshake requirements in [13] . Since this informal specification is not self-contained, it refers to many documents, e.g., the alert management.
The alert management is incharge of on handling handshake errors. If a handshake requirement is not respected, the handshake should be aborted with an alert message. We defined the following AlertType, an enumeration of all possible alert messages. Each process takes as parameter an alert type, which is initialized by an "undefined" alert in the main process. If a handshake requirement is not respected in a process, this one should assign the corresponding alert type to the out alert parameter, and the handshake is aborted with the corresponding alert message. During the implementation process of the handshake interactions, we took advantage of the semantics of the LNT. Consider for instance the following requirement: the TLS 1.3 handshake refuses renegotiation without a hello retry request message. The client hello message can only arrive at the beginning of the handshake, or right after a hello retry request message. In all other cases if a client hello message arrives, the handshake should be aborted with an alert. To implement this requirement we used the LNT operator "disrupt", which allows at any time a possible disruption of a block by another block. In the following LNT code, we have for instance the possible disruption of a "content" behaviour by a client hello message, followed by an alert. 
Validation
To validate our formal model of the TLS handshake, we follow an approach based on model-based testing [5] . Model-based testing enables us to corroborate a model (M) of a system under test (SUT) and an implementation of the SUT by checking the conformance between them. Conformance testing consists of extraction of test cases (TCs) from M in order to observe whether the SUT is conform to M or not. In this work we used TESTOR [15] , a recent tool for on-the-fly conformance test case generation guided by test purposes, developed on top of the CADP toolbox [11] . Since there is no available implementation of the TLS 1.3 handshake as far as we know, our SUT in this validation process is an implementation of TLS 1.2 [1] .
Approach overview
Our approach to validate our model is depicted in Figure 2 . Concretely, given a formal LNT model M of the TLS handshake and a test purpose in LNT, TESTOR automatically generates a test case (TC) encoded in the BCG file format. The generated test case has a verdict. There are three possible verdicts: fail when the SUT is not conform to M, pass when the test purpose is reached, or inconclusive when there is no error but the test purpose is not reached. Using the CADP verification toolbox [11] , the BCG test case is translated into a readable DOT representation, which is read by the execution framework. The test implementation parses the input file and categorizes the extracted data. In turn, this is used to make concrete Java based TLS messages for testing the SUT. First a trace is defined according to the state transitions from the TC. Then a SUT is tested and during execution the framework creates and submits TLS messages to the server and reads the resulting output. All exchanged messages are tracked as well as their order and finally, the obtained sequence is checked for inclusion in the initial LNT model. This establishes whether the execution was conform to the initial model or not. 
Test purposes
A test purpose aims to select a functionality to be tested, by guiding the selection of test cases. We defined three test purposes corresponding to three requirements from the draft TLS 1.3 handshake [13]:
I. The protocol messages must be sent in the right order, using classical TLS 1.3 order, (without hello retry request message).
II. The handshake must be aborted with an "unexpected message" alert, if there is a client renegotiation.
III. The protocol messages are sent in the right order with an incorrect key shared (with hello retry request message).
The LNT models of these test purposes are given in Appendix B.1, B.2, B.3, respectively. Given our formal LNT model of the TLS handshake and our test purposes, we automatically generated with TESTOR the abstract test cases, represented in a simplified form in Figure 3a , Figure 3b , and Figure 3c . During this validation process we found an error in our model, with test purpose III. We couldn't reach this accepting state of purpose, because of our intial implementation of this requirement: "The server hello message should have the same cryptographic information as the hello retry request message." We change our model to correct this issue. In fact, we were assigning to the hello retry request encryption data the value of the server hello encryption data, whereas the hello retry request message arrives before the server hello message.
The generated abstract test cases are then refined for becoming suitable inputs of the execution framework on the SUT. This described in the next section.
Test execution
If a client wants to establish a communication channel over HTTPS with the server, then the TLS handshake procedure is done automatically. However, for testing purposes it is necessary to emulate this interaction in a controlled way. In fact, we want to establish a connection to a TLS implementation with our program and automatically test the SUT by following a formal specification. For this sake, we use exit 10 TLS-Attacker [2] , which already encompasses a basic functionality in order to communicate with a SUT. We extend the tool with additional functionality and establish a connection with the formal model. First, the representation of the test case encoded in the DOT format is parsed and categorized by the tool. Table 1 depicts the obtained results for the TC III ( Figure 3c ) and instructs the execution. Then, the framework creates TLS messages on the fly according to the table, submits them against a SUT, and reads its responses. Since no concrete values for the parameters of the messages are assigned, some default values from the tool are used for testing purposes. Finally, the execution terminates, either after the sequence from the table has been executed, or if interruptions have occurred. In any case, the resulting trace will give evidence about the execution.
The test oracle in this case represents the initial list of expected states derived from the test case. After every executed action the table gives an expected output in that state. Any discrepancy means that the test did not proceed as expected.
Analysis of test execution
For the evaluation two different test cases have been generated. The framework tests OpenSSL version 1.0.1e [1] and tracks the interaction. The generated abstract test cases from the TLS 1.3 handshake model ( Figure 3b and Figure 3c ) are converted into abstract test cases for the execution framework. As already mentioned, the generated test cases from LNT are parsed by the implementation. The tool handles the concretization automatically by itself.
One of the ideas behind our approach is applicability, i.e, it should be possible to test a wide range of TLS implementations by only slightly manipulating the overall system. For example, only the port has to be changed manually in order to test another application. The test results give information about a verdict. The test case can be either complete, in case that all paths inside the model have been traversed, or incomplete. The second scenario can occur either due to unexpected behavior because of concrete values inside the TLS' parameters.
In general, since TLS is very complex and manipulates a large number of concrete values, the individual parameter assignments do have a big impact on the execution. However, in this work we will omit the test case concretization possibilities.
When testing in accordance to the TLS 1.3 handshake LNT formal model M, we achieve a complete test run. First, the initial clientHello is sent, after which the standard three server-side responses occur. Then we submit an unexpected clientHello again and try to re-negotiate the handshake procedure. As expected, the server sends an Alert message with the following description in TLSAttacker:
ALERT message:
Level: FATAL Description: UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
The trace obtained from the execution framework confirms that all TLS messages have been sent or received. The system responded as expected when being confronted with unexpected input. Thus, the behavior of the SUT is in conformance to the given TLS 1.3 handshake LNT formal model. We conclude that the test case has been successful. (Figure 3c ), which corresponds to Table 1 , an additional client-side CertificateRequest was specified. Since sending this TLS event is not mandatory, we want to check whether the execution might proceed further or ignore the message. However, the obtained trace indicates that, at least the current version of OpenSSL, does not reply to the request with the expected certificate. The verdict here is an incomplete test case. This is likely to be caused by the concrete implementation of OpenSSL. Either a CertificateRequest is not tolerated during this point of the handshake, or a preceding concrete value causes the issue at this point. According to given circumstances, we conclude that the SUT does not behave in conformance to the model.
Related Work
Formal specification of TLS: In [16] the authors propose a technique for derivation of models from the specification of TLS implementations. They focus on session languages for sequences of actions from a protocol and automatically infer formal specifications of these languages. Their approach is a black-box testing-based approach where statecharts are extracted from implementations. In this way security leaks might be detected in the host application. As opposed, in our approach specifications are not extracted but already given. [8] discusses formal methods for the TLS handshake protocol for e-commerce properties. They rely on the tool UPPAAL for verifying the TLS functionalities. They describe the handshake and the behavior of TLS messages in forms of timed automata. Then, they validate the protocol by checking the correct message flow between client and server.
Conformance testing of TLS:
A set of tools for TLS 1.3, which includes a conformance testing technique, is provided [14] . The TLS conformance checker communicates with nqsb-TLS, a TLS implementation, whereas a test oracle tracks a session from the interaction and checks whether it is conform with the protocol specification. Then, these sessions can be replicated and run against another TLS under test. A different behavior of the SUT in comparison with nqsb-TLS indicates a discrepancy. The main difference to our approach is that the authors rely on a reference implementation of conformance checks. On the contrary, our approach compares the outputs of a SUT with test cases obtained from a formal LNT model.
White box testing:
The authors of [3] present an approach with the goal to improve TLS implementations. For this sake, a framework for verification of C implementations for TLS functionality is provided. Formal definitions are provided for TLS in order to ease the verification of implementations. Here, a specification of TLS event packets is provided with corresponding extensions in the clientHello message. The authors use their framework for verification of functions from PolarSSL, a TLS implementation. In contrast to their work, our approach relies on LNT for formalization of TLS. Also, the testing process follows a black-box conformance testing approach instead of individual C function verification.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a formal LNT model of the draft Transport Layer Security TLS handshake protocol version 1.3, the first formal model as far as we know. We first gave an overview of this widely-used security protocol, then we discussed the choices and the challenges of this implementation in LNT. Finally, we validated our model using conformance testing techniques, and discussed the results. As outlined in other security testing related works (e.g., [18] ), multiple TLS implementations behave differently when being confronted with the same inputs. Whereas some applications indicate a high degree of resistance against any unexpected messages in terms of abstract or concrete values, others are more tolerant. This leads to the conclusion that TLS implementations do not always follow the strict specification of the protocol. In this case, conformance testing can help in order to detect the discrepancies.
In the future, we plan to enhance our TLS.1.3 handshake LNT model, to handle more extensions, and to implement the end of early data, the new session ticket and key update messages. Our model is easily extendable, thanks to the "union like" types. We also plan to improve our validation process by using as a system under test the future implementations of the TLS 1.3 handshake and by specifying TLS attacks as test purposes. [13] IETF (2018): The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.4 draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24. Available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.
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A Formal Model of the TLS 1.3 Handshake in LNT
Our model is decomposed in three modules, a first one with the type definitions, a second one with process definitions common to specification and the test purposes, and a last one with the process definitions used only in the specification. The decomposition avoids the duplication of code during the validation process.
A.1 Handshake types module HANDSHAKETYPE with "==", "!=", "get", "set", "head", "tail" is ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------type Compression_methods is T_NULL, DEFLATE, LZS end type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
type Session_id is T_NULL, 32byteID end type
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
type Ciphers is list of ciphertype end type 
type BYTE is x00, x01, x02, x03, x04, x05, x06, x07, x08, x09, x0F, xFF end type
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------type Cookie is list of BYTE end type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------type CertificateAuthoritiesExtension is list of BYTE end type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------type CertificateExtensionOid is list of BYTE end type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------type CertificateExtensionValues is list of BYTE end type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------type CertificateType is
RawPublicKey, X509 end type
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
type NamedGroup is --cf. Appendix B.3.1.4 of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 --Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) ecp256r1,
type OIDFilter is peer (oid: CertificateExtensionOid, value: CertificateExtensionValues) end type ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
type Extensions is list of Extension with "reverse", "member", "remove" end type
OCSPStatusRequest (responderId: ResponderIdList, extensions: Extensions) end type 
type Entries is list of Entry with "reverse", "member", "remove" end type ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- type CertificateRequestContext is list of BYTE end type 
ServerHello (protocol_version: ProtocolVersion, random: Random32, cipher_suite: ciphers, extensions: Extensions) end type
HelloRetryRequest (protocol_version: ProtocolVersion, cipher_suite: ciphers, extensions: Extensions) end type ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Certificate (crc: certificateRequestContext, certificate_list: Entries) end type
CertificateVerify (algorithm: SignatureSchemeList, ss: Signature) end type ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
serverh (ServerHello(TLS12, 28byteRand, random_select_ciphers, {})) end process ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------
